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The consequential Nationalist–Globalist policy divide in contemporary Britain: some initial analyses

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ABSTRACT


The verdict delivered by voters in the 2015 and 2017 British General Elections and the European Union Referendum surprised pollsters, pundits, the media, and even the victors. Political choices representative of Globalist outlooks saw defeat at the polls. Liberal Democratic support was below 10% and voting to remain in the EU underperformed predictions. Empirical analyses demonstrate that there is a Nationalist–Globalist policy divide, partially rooted in demographics and authoritarian predispositions, which go beyond traditional valence factors in explaining the recent choices of the British electorate. Moreover, this outlook influences how satisfied citizens are with the way democracy works in Britain. Nationalist viewpoints, when juxtaposed against Globalist outlooks, are salient in a way they were not during the height of Thatcherism, encompass left–right economic concerns and may portend a new era in British political culture.

Introduction

Recent elections and referenda across the globe produced results that may constitute a pushback against globalization. Majorities of elected officials, business leaders, and educated citizens in managerial and professional positions usually favour an integrated world with few trade barriers, liberal immigration policies, and cosmopolitan values, but enthusiasm for these tenets appears lacking among key voting blocs. The rise of populist parties across Europe, Donald Trump's successful White House run, and the British referendum vote to leave the European Union reveal opposition to a broad elite consensus.

An obvious realization of the anti-Globalist sentiment in Britain is the June 2016 referendum vote for the UK to leave the European Union. While Brexit is a consequential and headline grabbing event, it is not a one off. In 2015, a

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General Election resulted in the drubbing of the pro-EU Liberal Democrats, and they did not regain much ground in the “snap election” with their call for a Brexit rethink. The 2015 election saw a significant rise in the popular vote share of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which for now appears to have crested. Their downfall likely is possible only because both Conservative and Labour MPs signalled their agreement with the populist party’s *raison d’être* – removing Britain from the supranational EU and restrictive immigration politics. Elected officials appear to acquiesce not because they believe Brexit will be a net positive for the UK but because they fear defeat and political ruin by the Nationalist tide.

In this paper, a “think piece”, we address the correlates and relevance of what we call a “Nationalist–Globalist” divide to contemporary British politics. Within this dimension sits attitudes about Britain’s foreign policy, immigration policies, and the government’s role in guaranteeing equal opportunity. In contrast to the Thatcher period, where foreign and domestic policy attitudes appear on different axes, these attitudes mesh in contemporary Britain. What distinguishes our paper from contemporary work on the Nationalist–Globalist divide is that in contemporary Britain, this ideological division encompasses traditional left–right economic attitudes. The profile of many voters on the issues comprising the cleavage does not accord to the choice offered to them by contemporary British parties and may help to explain why the party system currently is so unstable.

Nationalism against globalism

The intuition behind what we label a Nationalist–Globalist posture is that nationalism is a “thin centred ideology” (Freeden 1998, 748) because the multiplicity of ideas and policy positions associated with the term can find a home across the political spectrum.¹ For nationalism to be meaningful, it requires situation within an ideological camp and juxtaposition against competing ideas. Nationalism sits comfortably as a form of anti-globalism, and together these concepts create a general middle rung of a hierarchy explained by demographics and values such as authoritarianism.²

Globalism as a quasi-belief system takes on many potential forms, with Steger (2013) distinguishing between “market” and “justice” globalism. In the economic realm, it involves the removal of state actions to control the market, deregulation, and removal of barriers that prevent the flow of capital across borders. Politically, Globalists wish to reduce the power of the nation-state, take measures to prevent the unilateral use of military force

¹This is not the only viewpoint – for a review of the theoretical debate over globalization as an ideology, see Soborski (2012).

²The hierarchical schema mimics the model of foreign policy attitudes of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987).

and increase the role of supra-national and non-governmental organizations. “Justice” comes about from states ceding sovereign functions to international institutions which solve coordination problems over public goods such as environmental regulations and pursue a world more equal (and many would say economically stronger) by allowing the free movements of people. Culturally, Globalists recognize and often celebrate different values and backgrounds. Scholars are aware of the role of citizen differences on aspects of the Globalist divide on political choice. Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde (2014) argue that the Globalist–Nationalist cleavage is a second and emergent dimension of political conflict in Europe. Kriesi et al. (2008) and Azmanova (2011) see the potential for the Globalist–Nationalist conflict to supplant the left–right economic cleavage in European politics.

A strategy for populist party success in the 1990s was economic liberalism, opposition to immigration and supra-national integration, and cultural conservatism (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). This tactic affirms the market form of globalism while rejecting its other tenets. As noted in a later paper (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 149), critiques of this “winning formula” abound because of questions as to whether those with Nationalist attitudes on culture, foreign policy, and immigration endorse neo-liberal economics (e.g. Betz 1996; Mudde 1996). At the mass level, few scholars view the mass issue space as uni-dimensional. Foreign and domestic affairs receive consideration as two different realms and Europe and cultural issues are sources of conflict that do not co-integrate with small versus big state type economic debates (Kriesi et al. 2008). When voters prioritize issues on the cultural-justice aspect of the Globalist–Nationalist cleavage so-called right wing populist parties see success partially because the supply of parties who favour economic integration and oppose immigration is low (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009).

There is reason to challenge the assumption that market and justice globalism are multi-dimensional in contemporary British politics. The strain of nationalism emerging post-2008 is distinct from the nationalism that undergirded the rise of Margaret Thatcher. Broad support for Thatcher-era reforms (as well as the birth of Tony Blair’s “New Labour”) derived from a “re-assemblage of the establishment” (Jessop 2016, 133–134) marked by broad elite consensus favouring a neo-liberal economic programme. There is now a perception of decades of stagnation among average Britons, and blame for this lies with neo-liberalism for delivering uneven prosperity. The 2008 financial crisis holds particular relevance as a near cataclysmic failure by elites, but with little to no accountability among elites. The British public experienced the pain of austerity, whereas elites continued with business as usual. To the extent that this account captures the “zeitgeist”, it is hardly surprising that elites who are “tone deaf” to the realities faced by everyday working citizens gives rise to an electorate desperate for change. In Britain,

the initial supply of options came from the right, with members of the Conservative Party openly challenging the consensus on Europe and immigration, but remaining committed to neo-liberalism. UKIP downplayed the economy as an issue and challenged the divided Conservatives from a uniformly Nationalist approach to immigration and Europe (Ford and Goodwin 2014). In the UK, however, we now have the question as to whether, with Jeremy Corbyn's capture – and defence – of the Labour leadership via direct elections and his Party's surprisingly strong showing in the 2017 General Election, we have a left-wing anti-Globalist party that now supplies voters with an option not seen in the party families of Western Europe. Corbyn's Labour is unabashedly Nationalist and, at the time of this writing, appears to be at peace with the need for stricter immigration policies and the decision of the British electorate to leave the European Union.

In this speculative paper, we argue that it is possible to construct empirically a clear narrative of the policy correlates of this anti-Globalist anger. An elite Globalist mind-set is one supportive of open markets, tolerant of immigration, enthusiastic about redistribution and income inequality (with foreign aid generating particular ire), and one happy to reduce national power thru a preference for international consensus in foreign policy decision-making. Elite consensus over the general parameters do not match the mass disunity present in modern Britain. Indeed, positions taken by opinion leader's accord with only a minority of the voters, giving rise to new players, which take advantage of unfilled gaps in the issue space. In many respects, this is classic Schattschneider-inspired or Downsian politics – leaders and parties arise by changing the scope of political conflict. In England, the rejection of the Globalist worldview was evident with the collapse of the Liberal Democrat vote share and rise of UKIP in the 2015 General Election. The EU referendum and the election of renegade Jeremy Corbyn in two leadership contests delivered a message to Britain's two major parties – co-opt the Nationalist mantra or go down to defeat. In the 2017 General Election, Labour and the Tories succeeded by acquiescing to delivering Brexit and restrictions on immigration. The Scottish National Party and Liberal Democrats who did not make peace with these policies performed poorly.

Our approach conceptualizes the new nationalism as the binding of domestic attitudes that are hostile to outgroups with a "Britain first" approach to international relations. In the next sections, we more fully discuss operationalization of these concepts, and we test whether data supports our story.

Britons feeling left behind by a changing global economy likely do not see the benefits of immigration, European integration, and comparative advantage. Rather, many view themselves as unfairly shunted aside, and benefits flowing to groups that do not share their values. To many, the policies advocated by the elite consensus are not the solution to "average citizens" but indeed the problem. Importantly, we hypothesize those opposed to cultural or justice globalism are not necessarily warm to economic globalism.

Data and constructing the Nationalist–Globalist posture

In March 2014, a representative quota sample of 5125 respondents from YouGov's online British panel completed a questionnaire designed to ascertain their attitudes about the political challenges and issues facing Great Britain.³ Our hypothesis is that we can classify citizens' outlooks as a Globalist, Nationalist, or something in between via examining their positions on five items:⁴

- (1) "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country".
- (2) "All further immigration to the UK should be halted".
- (3) "The UK needs a strong military to be effective in international relations".
- (4) "The UK doesn't need to withdraw from international affairs, it just needs to stop letting international organizations tell us what we can and can't do".
- (5) A seven-point bipolar scale with endpoints "Government should get out of the business of promoting income equality" and "Government should do more to reduce income inequality".

We code responses so that higher values indicate greater scepticism over immigration, non-governmental oversight of British actions, and income and rights equality and a greater desire to see the UK maintain a strong military. The average respondent shows scepticism towards the more "Globalist" positions of respecting equal rights, welcoming immigration, and seeking diplomatic, multilateral solutions to the world's challenges.⁵ In contrast, the average respondent for the seven-point income equality scale is at the midpoint (3.53), suggesting that Britons are Nationalists on the cultural and justice indicators but *not* necessarily Globalists on the economic side.

Validating the Nationalist–Globalist posture: the divided British populace

To answer the question of whether these five items sit together as a single posture, we employ two types of latent variable analyses. An initial Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) treats responses to the survey items as ordinal and

³The sampling frame excludes respondents residing in Northern Ireland. Data are weighted. Our data come from a multi-wave data set spanning several years. Our measures of authoritarianism come from the first wave of the survey, fielded more than two years prior to questions concerning the EU Referendum we use as one of our dependent variables. Data to replicate empirical analysis are available via the UK Data Archive: <https://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-851142/>.

⁴The first four items are five point agree-disagree Likert scales, while the fifth is a self-placement on a seven-point bipolar scale.

⁵Space restrictions relegate the table with response distributions of the items to the Online Appendix.

suggests that a hypothesized single factor model fits the data well.⁶ The five-indicator model containing the economic equality measure does not substantially worsen standard approximate fit statistics, suggesting the various aspects of Nationalism–Globalism can form a coherent measure in contemporary Britain. This single factor solution combining foreign and domestic policy items reflective of what we consider multiple aspects of the Nationalist–Globalist divide contrasts with a factor analysis of similar indicators from the 1983 British Election Study conducted at the height of Thatcherism.⁷

To validate our empirical claims further and classify voters for the multivariate models to follow, we employ latent profile analysis (LPA) (a “mixture” model) to ascertain how the 2014 British sample clusters on the five items. LPA treats the items as continuous and looks for underlying and unobserved groups with similar means across items while accounting for the presence of measurement error (Oberski 2016). This technique classifies voters into simple nominal classes based upon the attitudes tapped by these five indicators. Optimum fit for the LPA analysis, estimated via Mplus (v.7.4), occurs by splitting the sample into three profiles.⁸

Profiles with four and five indicators, with full results presented in Table 1, yield interesting but slightly different stories. For the four-item estimation (without the “promote equality” indicator), nearly half (47%) of all respondents fit a “Moderate Globalist” profile. In addition, approximately 25% of the sample we define as “Nationalist” and an additional 29% as anti-immigrant but having slightly less Nationalist attitudes on the other indicators.

The three profiles from the five-indicator analysis present an alternative outlook. Here, we see a larger moderate category (approximately 60% of the sample). These profile members bend in the Nationalist direction on all but the income inequality indicators. The other two profiles in the five-item analysis constitute smaller proportions (compared to the four-item profiles), but contain distinct average positions. There is a small group of respondents (11%) in a profile containing stridently Globalist positions on immigration, equal rights, but favouring income redistribution. In a cultural and justice

⁶The Online Appendix contains the full results from the CFA. The “income equality” indicator has the weakest association with the latent variable, but it still points to the contradiction that those most sceptical of cultural and justice globalism are moderate on this indicator while the small number supportive of cultural and justice globalism are highly sceptical of neoliberal economic policies. The different policy domains are not orthogonal to one another.

⁷Results from a CFA of the 1983 BES data are in the Online Appendix. A single factor can only explain domestic policy item responses, with this latent variable explaining a very low percentage of the variance of the foreign policy indicators.

⁸A Vuong–Lo–Mendell–Rubin Likelihood Ratio test (Vuong 1989) comparing the three-profile solution to one with only two profiles is significant in both instances. A four-profile solution for the four and five indicator models did not converge because of “boundary solutions” between the fourth extracted profile and the immigration indicator (Abar and Loken 2012). Fixing the variance of the indicator to a very small number allows for a solution, but differentiating between profiles becomes difficult.

Table 1. LPA of UK respondents based on four and five-indicator models of nationalism/anti-cosmopolitanism.

Profile	% in profile	Most likely class by latent class (diagonals) (%)	Income inequality	Equal rights	Halt immigration	Strong military	Stop taking orders from international organizations
<i>Four indicators:</i>							
Profile 1 (Moderate Globalist)	46.6%	92.9		2.58	2.16	3.12	3.21
Profile 2 (Nationalist)	24.9%	84.8		4.54	3.99	4.32	4.54
Profile 3 (Anti-Immigrant Moderate Nationalist)	28.5%	80.3		3.43	4.54	3.62	4.03
<i>Five indicators:</i>							
Profile 1 (Globalist)	11.0%	92.4	1.21	1.40	1.45	2.66	2.65
Profile 2 (Nationalist)	28.9%	88.3	4.01	4.12	4.71	4.21	4.54
Profile 3 (Moderate)	60.1%	91.2	3.53	3.21	2.96	3.38	3.58

Notes: LPA conducted in Mplus v7.4 with Robust Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Sample size adjusted BIC for four-indicator solution: 57,446.29 (best likelihood value: -28,653.673). Sample size adjusted BIC for five-indicator solution: 75,853.91 (best likelihood value: -37,841.167). Effective weighted sample size for four-indicator solution: 5023; effective weighted sample size for five-indicator solution: 5112.

sense, they are Globalist but in an economic sense, they are not. On matters of foreign policy, members of this profile are more sceptical of a strong military while more welcoming of international consensus building. The remaining profile (29% of the sample) contains respondents deeply hostile to immigration (mean position on the five-point scale = 4.71), militarist and unilateralist in their outlook, and yet are only slightly more accepting of income inequality than those residing in the moderate profile. We label this profile “Nationalist”.⁹

In summary, the five-indicator LPA places most of the British electorate into a “moderate” category, but it is important to note that the mean score of the moderate profile respondents on most of the scales. Further, more than double the number of Britons fall into a “Nationalist” as opposed to “Globalist” profile in the five-indicator model. Taken together, these results show that a substantially large proportion of the British public is at least moderately Nationalist, with a sizable minority being very Nationalist. However, even those in the profile most sceptical of cultural and justice globalism do not find themselves at the extreme end of favouring the laissez-faire approach often attributed to economic globalism.

The demographic and authoritarian correlates of the Nationalist–Globalist divide

Citizen outlooks along the Globalist–Nationalist divide have important and understandable demographic antecedents.¹⁰ There are meaningful differences in profile membership based on age, profession, and education. There are also modest differences based on region, but only negligible differences in profile membership based on gender.

Highlights from the five-indicator model are that older respondents are disproportionately Nationalist compared to younger respondents (37–17%, respectively). Working class voters are least likely to have a Globalist orientation (8%) and most likely to fit into the Nationalist profile (34%). White-collar professionals and managers are far more likely to be Globalist (15%) and far less likely to be Nationalist (21%) than other occupation groups. University degree holders are more Globalist than those with less education. Scotland is home to more Globalists (15%) and fewer Nationalists (22%) than

⁹To avoid wordiness, we use the terms “Globalist” and “Nationalist” to describe the latent profiles for the remainder of the paper. We remind readers that those in the former are highly sceptical of weakening national efforts to regulate the economy, and those in the latter group have attitudes on the matter that are far from libertarian.

¹⁰The Online Appendix presents demographic cross-tabulations for both the four- and five-indicator LPAs. A simple cut-off differentiates university graduates and non-university graduates because of the vast press commentary on the more Globalist outlook of those with university experience. For the multivariate analyses, robustness checks reveal that key findings concerning the demographic correlates of the profiles and the relationship between the correlates and political choices remain when controls for more refined levels of education appear in the models.

other regions of the UK.¹¹ Interestingly, while the East of England is the region hosting the highest percentage of respondents in the Nationalist profile (36%), not far behind them are traditional Labour Party bastions of the North-east (34%) and Yorkshire and Humber (33%) regions.

In addition to the demographic antecedents, we think there is an important attitudinal disposition that is causally prior to the Nationalist–Globalist divide – authoritarianism.¹² Authoritarianism should affect this Globalist–Nationalist policy divide because to Nationalists, the nation already has optimal values and traditional arrangements worth preserving; violations of societal conventions and order are what “broke things”. Authoritarianism drives anger and resentment towards the beneficiaries of a more interconnected and cosmopolitan world – whether rich and educated urban elites or low-skilled immigrants or minorities – because they are perceived to undermine the core of Britishness (see Stenner 2005; Haidt 2016 for how the Globalist–Nationalist divide can activate authoritarian predispositions that in more settled time are passive and latent).

Full results of an LPA on three indicators of authoritarianism appear in the Online Appendix, but similar to the Nationalism–Globalism posture, the UK electorate divides into three profiles. Approximately 1 in 10 voters (9.8%) are “Permissive” on this scale, having mean scores suggesting disagreement that learning obedience and respect is important for children, scepticism that learning about customs and heritage is important for people, and opposing the corporal punishment of children. Just under 4 in 10 citizens (38.7%) fit a more “Moderate” profile, slightly more opposed on average to physically punishing children but slightly more supportive than not of teaching obedience and respect and valuing heritage and customs. A large 51.5% of the British sample have average positions near the high extreme of the scale, leading to their classification as “Authoritarians”.

Those in the small Permissive Authoritarianism profile are far more likely to be Globalists in their policy orientation. In the five-indicator profile analysis, they comprise less than 10% of the sample but account for 41% of those

¹¹An anonymous reviewer wisely noted the irony of weak “Nationalist” opinion in Scotland, a nation within the UK governed by a “Nationalist” party. This reinforces our above point about the “thin centeredness” of nationalism, and its need to sit against competing ideas. Aside from making a case for independence, recent Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) manifestos appear to stand deliberately against ideas espoused by the governing Westminster Conservatives. Embracing progressive ideas concerning immigration and the need to be a “post-sovereign” state adhering to norms and rules generated by international organizations build the SNP’s case that Scotland is different (Jackson 2014). For more on the embrace of cultural pluralism and values considered post-materialist by Nationalist parties such as the SNP, see van der Zwet (2015).

¹²Three items attempt to capture different facets of authoritarianism outlined by Altemeyer (1981): “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn” (authoritarian submission); “Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them” (traditionalism); and “Parents and other authorities have forgotten that good old-fashioned physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly” (authoritarian aggression).

classified as Globalists. Authoritarians comprise just over half the sample (52%), but 80% and 83% of Authoritarians reside in the four and five indicator Nationalist profiles. Respondents' policy outlooks link to core apolitical predispositions.¹³

Table 2 reports a multinomial logit estimation of profile membership onto key demographics, occupational status, Eurosceptic press readership, and authoritarian profile membership. In the five-indicator LPA, the baseline respondent with a Moderate Authoritarian profile has a 17% probability of being in the Nationalist profile. Chances shift to only 6% if the respondent moves to a Permissive profile and increases to 44% if the respondent has an Authoritarian orientation. A permissive, university graduate, non-Eurosceptic press reading, manager has a simulated probability of 46% of falling into a Globalist profile and only a 2% probability of falling into the Nationalist profile. An Authoritarian, working class, Eurosceptic newspaper reading individual has an extremely low 0.2% estimated chance of classification as a Globalist but a 58% chance of a Nationalist classification. Papers read, class, educational status, and authoritarian predisposition have a marked relationship with policy orientations.¹⁴

The political consequences of the Globalist–Nationalist policy divide

Voting and elections: Above results show a clear linkage between the Globalist–Nationalist policy divide among the British electorate and demographic differences and authoritarian predispositions. This section addresses whether this policy divide is politically consequential, manifesting itself in voting behaviour and in respondents' satisfaction with democracy.

Recent analyses of British electoral choice (cf. Clarke et al. 2004, 2009; Whiteley et al. 2013) give pride of place on the explanatory power so-called valence forces have in determining voter choice. Close to the vote, valence factors are non-ideological in nature and include identification with the parties, reactions to the party leaders and views about performance of the national economy. In Table 3, we estimate a multinomial logit model distinguishing between the voter's choice between the Conservatives, UKIP, and the Liberal Democrats/Labour that includes the key valence factors of attitudes towards the four party leaders, retrospective economic evaluations, and

¹³In turn, the authoritarian predisposition links to other apolitical scales such as ones measuring "Big 5" personality traits (see Sibley and Duckitt 2008). Simulations below utilize the CLARIFY package for Stata v.14 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

¹⁴The relationship between the Nationalist–Globalist posture and Eurosceptic press readership likely contains a degree of endogeneity as does the relationship between media choice and voting behaviour in the General Election and EU Referendum. We include this variable because we wish to emphasize that, controlling for media consumption, the relationship between and the posture and political choice still obtains.

Table 2. Multinomial logit estimations predicting most likely profile membership.

	Four indicator:		Five indicator:	
	Moderate Globalist vs. Nationalist	Moderate Globalist vs. Anti-Immigrant/Moderate Nationalist	Moderate vs. Globalist	Moderate vs. Nationalist
<i>Basic demographics:</i>				
Male	−0.23 (0.16)	−0.40* (0.15)	−0.29 (0.23)	−0.43** (0.14)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)
Non-White/Non-British Origin	−0.17 (0.28)	−0.43 (0.30)	0.26 (0.34)	0.36 (0.26)
University Graduate	−0.47** (0.18)	−0.54*** (0.18)	0.87*** (0.26)	−0.41* (0.17)
<i>Occupation:</i>				
Professional/Manager	−0.14 (0.18)	−0.60*** (0.18)	−0.33 (0.25)	−0.46** (0.17)
Public sector	0.37 (0.28)	−0.18 (0.25)	0.04 (0.41)	0.27 (0.23)
Private sector	0.28 (0.29)	−0.17 (0.26)	0.26 (0.45)	0.10 (0.23)
Interface Sector	−0.33 (0.23)	−0.04 (0.22)	−0.02 (0.32)	−0.37 (0.20)
Trade Union	−0.24 (0.29)	0.11 (0.25)	0.52 (0.29)	−0.71* (0.29)
<i>Region:</i>				
London	−0.17 (0.24)	−0.23 (0.25)	0.60 (0.31)	−0.04 (0.22)
Scotland	−0.60* (0.29)	−0.08 (0.25)	−0.72 (0.41)	−0.41 (0.26)
Wales	−1.03* (0.44)	0.08 (0.31)	0.26 (0.42)	−0.75* (0.36)
<i>News:</i>				
Reads Eurosceptic Press	1.04*** (0.16)	0.50** (0.16)	−2.06*** (0.47)	0.55*** (0.14)
<i>Authoritarian profile:</i>				
Permissive	−1.45** (0.49)	−1.18*** (0.35)	1.52*** (0.27)	−0.96 (0.56)
Authoritarian	1.47*** (0.17)	0.70*** (0.16)	−1.15*** (0.30)	1.33*** (0.16)
Constant:	−1.32** (0.42)	−0.40 (0.39)	−2.80*** (0.64)	−1.65*** (0.35)

Notes: Wave 1 respondents only. Sample Size for Four Indicator Model = 1382; Sample Size for Five Indicator Model = 1396. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ^2 (28df): 378.31; Five Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ^2 (30df): 484.24. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

demographic controls. We add additional dichotomous variables placing the respondent into their most likely Globalist–Nationalist policy profile.¹⁵

The valence factors perform well, *but* their inclusion does not negate a distinct role for one’s policy profile. A male, non-university educated,

¹⁵For ease of presentation, Labour/Liberal Democrats combine into a single category. Respondents stating they did not intend to vote, vote for one of the Nationalist (the Scottish Nationalist Party or Plaid Cymru) or minor parties do not appear in this analysis. A model replacing party leader feeling thermometers with respondents’ partisan identification produces similar results to the model presented in the text – results available in the Online Appendix.

Table 3. Multinomial logit estimations predicting voter support for UKIP and the conservatives.

	Four indicator:		Five indicator:	
	Labour/LibDem vs. Conservative	Labour/LibDem vs. UKIP	Labour/LibDem vs. Conservative	Labour/LibDem vs. UKIP
<i>Globalist/</i>				
<i>Nationalist profile:</i>				
Nationalist	0.37 (0.27)	1.10*** (0.26)	0.19 (0.20)	0.59*** (0.20)
Anti-Immigrant Nationalist	0.32 (0.21)	1.17*** (0.25)	XX	XX
Globalist	XX	XX	-1.58** (0.56)	-3.28 (1.51)
<i>Leader</i>				
<i>thermometers:</i>				
David Cameron	0.97*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.96*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
Edward Miliband	-0.74*** (0.05)	-0.72*** (0.05)	-0.73*** (0.04)	-0.71*** (0.05)
Nick Clegg	-0.38*** (0.28)	-0.34*** (0.04)	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.34*** (0.05)
Nigel Farage	0.14*** (0.40)	0.78*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.78*** (0.23)
<i>Economic</i>				
<i>perceptions:</i>				
National	-0.33 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.22)	-0.02 (0.32)	-0.37 (0.20)
performance	0.28** (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	0.26* (0.10)	-0.18 (0.10)
Constant:	-3.01*** (0.56)	-1.99*** (0.59)	-2.78*** (0.56)	-1.38* (0.57)

Notes: Demographic, occupational, and regional controls present in Table 2 included in estimations but not shown due to space considerations. Data from March 2014 wave of the survey. Sample size for both estimates: 2618. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ^2 (38df): 3319.16; Five Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ^2 (38df): 3321.38. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

working class respondent with average feeling thermometer evaluations of each party leader and the performance of the economy is estimated to have 13% and 15% chances of voting Tory and 8% and 12% chances of voting UKIP in the four and five-indicator models, respectively. Moving the respondent away from the Moderate Globalist and Moderate profiles and into the Nationalist profiles increases the probability of a Conservative choice to 16% in both the four and five-indicator models. UKIP's chances increase to 19% in both models. Additional simulations shifting differences hypothetical respondents' feelings about UKIP leader Nigel Farage and Conservative Leader David Cameron suggest that in most circumstances, UKIP sees a greater gain than the Tories when respondents move to having a Nationalist policy profile.

Next, we consider intended vote in the EU referendum circa early spring 2015, which divided the sample nearly evenly with 43% stating they would vote "Remain" and 40% stating they would "Leave". Undecided were 17%, and Table 4 looks at the factors that shift respondents away from ambivalence

Table 4. Multinomial logit estimations predicting EU referendum choice.

	Four indicator:		Five indicator:	
	Don't Know vs. Remain	Don't Know vs. Leave	Don't Know vs. Remain	Don't Know vs. Leave
<i>Globalist/Nationalist profile:</i>				
Nationalist	−0.46* (0.18)	0.64*** (0.18)	−0.32 (0.17)	0.63*** (0.15)
Anti-Immigrant Nationalist	−0.54*** (0.16)	0.34* (0.16)	XX	XX
Globalist	XX	XX	1.15**** (0.24)	−0.19 (0.34)
<i>Party identification:</i>				
Conservative	0.29 (0.19)	0.28 (0.19)	0.32 (0.19)	0.32 (0.19)
Labour	0.82*** (0.16)	0.19 (0.17)	0.81*** (0.16)	0.22 (0.17)
Liberal Democrat	1.54*** (0.31)	0.82* (0.35)	1.59*** (0.31)	0.87* (0.34)
UKIP	−0.41 (0.51)	1.71*** (0.36)	−0.37 (0.51)	1.76*** (0.36)
<i>Economic perceptions:</i>				
National Performance	0.20** (0.07)	−0.04 (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)	−0.02 (0.07)
<i>EU attitudes:</i>				
EU Sells More Goods	0.03 (0.08)	0.24** (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.22** (0.08)
EU MEPs Paid More	−0.11 (0.08)	0.17* (0.08)	−0.12 (0.08)	0.17* (0.08)
UK Contributes Too Much to EU	−0.21** (0.07)	0.51*** (0.08)	−0.17* (0.07)	0.51*** (0.08)
<i>Newspaper:</i>				
Reads Eurosceptic Press	−0.13 (0.14)	0.53*** (0.14)	−0.06 (0.14)	0.52*** (0.14)
Constant:	−0.60 (0.48)	−4.88*** (0.51)	−1.05* (0.49)	−4.88*** (0.52)

Notes: Demographic, occupational, and regional controls present in Table 2 included in estimations but not shown due to space considerations. Data from March 2014 and April 2015 waves of the survey. Sample Size for both estimates: 2378. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2(46df)$: 1131.02; Five Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2(46df)$: 1170.23. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

to a Stay or Leave position.¹⁶ This estimation adds the Globalist–Nationalist Profile of the respondent to control variables frequently identified as correlates of EU referendum voting. These are partisan identification, Eurosceptic Press readership, and economic evaluations. Included as controls are respondents’ level of agreement with three statements (of varying accuracy) concerning the European Union: (1) that the EU sells more goods to Britain than vice versa; (2) that European MEPs are paid more than UK Members of Parliament; and (3) that Britain pays a much higher contribution to the EU than it should.

¹⁶We exclude respondents who said they would not vote in the referendum from Table 4 analyses. Respondents who answer both the March 2014 and spring 2015 waves of the study appear in this analysis. Questions pertaining to the European Union in the analyses appear in the spring 2015 wave.

Results displayed in [Table 4](#) are telling as the placement of a respondent into one of the three profiles in either model is, in many instances just as potent as partisan identification or more proximate attitudes towards the European Union. In the model with the four-indicator profile, a non-partisan, non-graduate male respondent residing outside of London, Scotland, or Wales with average attitudes towards national economic performance and on the specific European questions is simulated to have a 41% of intending to vote “Remain”, 28% chance of wanting to “Leave”, and a 31% chance of being undecided. In the five-indicator model, the percentages are 33% in each category. Shifting the respondent to a Nationalist profile increases the probability of a “Leave” response to 49% and 51% in the models with four and five indicators and this comes primarily at the expense of the “Remain” choice. In the four-indicator model, if the respondent instead moves from the Moderate Globalist profile into the Anti-Immigrant Nationalist Profile, the simulated probability of choosing “Leave” increases to 42%. For the model with the five-indicator LPA, moving from a Moderate to a Globalist profile increases the choosing Remain to 65% and decreases choosing Leave to only 17%.

To provide an idea of the potency of the effects of shifting away from the Moderate profiles, additional simulations show that moving our baseline respondent from no partisan identification to supporting UKIP shifts the probability for leave to greater than 70%. Moving to supporting the Liberal Democrats produces a strong shift towards Remain. However, the effects of shifting to the Globalist profile is stronger than the effect of moving from non-identification to Labour and movement into Nationalism has more of an influence than shifting towards identification with the Conservatives. This shift is stronger than moving the respondent into a category that has them reading one of the Eurosceptic papers. The effect of moving the respondent from “Strongly Disagreeing” that the UK Pays More than it Should into the European Union to “Strongly Agree” produces a shift in the leave direction of approximately 40% for our hypothetical respondent. Shifts observed from moving from Strongly Disagreeing to Strongly Agreeing on the other two statements directly referencing the European Union produce smaller shifts than moving the respondent from the four and five indicator Moderate to Nationalist profiles. Broad based Nationalist–Globalist policy positions are relevant to the decision to leave or remain in the EU and they trump some measures considered proximate to the referendum decision.

Democracy: The Nationalist–Globalist policy positioning of citizens is central to voter choice in recent British elections, but can also shape views of the overall system. People supporting losing parties and candidates often show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy than those backing winners (Anderson and Guillory 1997). We hypothesize that Nationalists,

Table 5. Globalism/nationalism and satisfaction with democracy.

	Four indicator Satisfaction with democracy	Five indicator Satisfaction with democracy
<i>Globalist/ Nationalist Profile:</i>		
Nationalist	−0.41* (0.18)	−0.34*** (0.16)
Anti-Immigrant Nationalist	−0.20 (0.17)	XX
Globalist	XX	−0.12 (0.23)
<i>Party identification:</i>		
Conservative	1.07*** (0.20)	1.02*** (0.20)
Labour	1.02*** (0.18)	1.02*** (0.18)
Liberal Democrat	0.72** (0.27)	0.74** (0.27)
UKIP	−0.45 (0.33)	−0.49 (0.33)
<i>Economic perceptions:</i>		
National performance	0.43*** (0.07)	0.42*** (0.07)
<i>Efficacy:</i>		
Internal efficacy	−0.16 (0.08)	−0.14 (0.08)
External efficacy	−0.49*** (0.09)	−0.49*** (0.09)
<i>Newspaper:</i>		
Reads Eurosceptic Press	−0.07 (0.16)	0.05 (0.16)
Constant:	−2.77*** (0.45)	−2.77*** (0.45)

Notes: Demographic, occupational, and regional controls present in Table 2 included in estimations but not shown due to space considerations. Data from March 2014 and April 2015 waves of the survey. Sample size for both estimates: 1126. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2(22df)$: 225.20; Five Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2(22df)$: 224.68. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

who are policy “losers” in an era where globalization dominates are likely to express lower levels of democratic satisfaction.

Table 5 presents results of a logit estimation differentiating respondents who express “satisfaction with the way democracy works in Britain” (coded 1) with those who either do not or are ambivalent.¹⁷ In addition to binary variables for the Nationalist/Globalist profiles, controls for partisan identification, media consumption, and internal and external political efficacy are included. Nationalists are less likely to report satisfaction with democracy in Britain than their Moderate and Moderate Globalist counterparts. By way of illustration, a respondent with the demographic characteristics of the above

¹⁷The “Satisfaction with Democracy” question appears in the May/June 2014 wave of the panel, coming shortly after the May 22 elections to the EU Parliament. Only 5% of the sample state that they are “Very Satisfied” but 46% state that they are “Fairly Satisfied” with democratic performance in the UK. This estimation includes only respondents who answered these two waves as well as the larger March 2014 wave.

baseline respondent but who is a Labour partisan is in both the four and five-indicator models simulated to have an approximately 50–50 chance of reporting that they are either “Very” or “Fairly” satisfied with the way democracy works in the country. Moving the respondent from the Moderate Globalist or Moderate profile to the Nationalist profile reduces the probability of indicating satisfaction by approximately 10%. This approximates the reduction we see if the respondent moves from an average to a minimum position on the internal efficacy factor. Interestingly, Globalists are no more satisfied with democratic performance than are Moderates.

Discussion

In the aftermath of the “Great Recession”, many British citizens still reel from financial ramifications linked to the near collapse of the global economy, have difficulty coping with rapid technological change, and live in a society where success depends on mobility. A small minority of Britons have the Globalist outlook, which embraces international cooperation and is open to changes brought about by immigration and the state facilitating opportunities for once marginalized groups. However, most oppose this “citizen of the world” outlook. Nationalists are less open to state intervention than those with a Globalist outlook are, but our empirical analyses suggest they fall far short of blindly embracing global neo-liberalism.¹⁸

The ability of attitudes on various aspects of the Globalist–Nationalist cleavage to cluster in contemporary Britain differs from that observed at the height of Thatcherism. It is possible to classify the contemporary British electorate by a relatively small number of profiles, and the profiles have demographic correlates. Although far from deterministic, those eschewing Nationalist policy type postures predominantly are university graduates in leading occupational positions with permissive positions on an authoritarianism scale.

A Globalist–Nationalist policy divide among the UK electorate has ramifications both for how citizens vote and for health of the democratic polity.¹⁹ In recent decades, it became passé to harp on sociological differences in political choice. Valence factors explain political outcomes when the lines of political conflict are established (e.g. Clarke et al. 2004). However, the post-2008 political world is deeply unsettled and economic changes on the horizon will make it even less so with politicians unable to offer viable solutions regardless of

¹⁸Concerns over economic globalism extend beyond the selected “Government getting out of the business of promoting income equality” indicator. A question on the panel asking whether trade should be an EU or a national responsibility reveal that 58% wished the UK to retain authority against the 30% who were comfortable with ceding power to the EU.

¹⁹Although space prohibits a full exploration, estimates contained in the Online Appendix suggest that the Nationalist–Globalist posture affects the way citizens view institutions such as the judiciary.

their stated desires to “take back control” (Frankel 2016). Support for parties and political choice in recent elections does not come down merely to charismatic leaders and economic evaluations. To win in contemporary Britain, politicians both left and right have to capture the Nationalist issue space, and we witnessed this in the recent referendum campaigns and two 2015 and 2017 General Elections.

That the Globalist–Nationalist posture goes beyond explaining political choice to affect satisfaction with democracy does not surprise. The distribution on this core policy posture suggests Globalists are a small coterie of the populace, university educated and in professional occupations, making the rules for an electorate where the median voter leans in a Nationalist direction, with at least 1 in 5 residing on a hard Nationalist posture.

What remains to be seen is whether the electoral choices of the UK electorate in the 2015 and 2017 General Election and 2016 Referendum campaign gives voice to enough people to allow levels of democratic satisfaction to rise. Pronouncements of Prime Minister Theresa May at the 2016 Conservative Party Conference and the initial hard lines the Government drew in early Brexit negotiations appears aimed at assuaging Nationalist sentiment.

Insurgent and successful Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn muted differences his Party had on the Nationalist–Globalist divide with those of the Tories during the 2017 campaign. However, the expectations and hopes of the portion of the electorate wishing to see policy move in an anti-Globalist direction can go unfulfilled. Globalization is a powerful force and even those in the Government with a Nationalist “UK First” bent may have to make pragmatic choices (MacShane 2016). Should Brexit and accompanying ancillary efforts fizzle, a question is whether this posture may become more salient in driving party choice, perhaps dampening further democratic satisfaction and attitudes towards political institutions.

Conclusion

A simplistic characterization of post-war British political history is one where a small number of elections set the ideological agenda and, for long periods, leader competence to manage the political programme determined the outcome of elections. The 1945 victory of Clement Attlee’s Labour Party cemented the notion that the British electorate favoured a generous welfare state. With the welfare state created, parties and leaders spent much of the 1950s and 1960s debating who could serve the electorate better in fashioning and providing generous benefits. Union unrest and economic uncertainty due to high inflation called into question the consensus over the Governments’ abilities to manage centrally the national economy (King 1975).

The Thatcher victory of 1979 smashed once widespread agreement surrounding the utility of a vast welfare state, and the calamitous defeat of

Michael Foot's fragmented Labour party in 1983 was a further nail in the coffin. From this period to the economic crisis of 2008, politics centred on debates over effective management of a society where semi-privatized public services and industries were increasingly not under the direct control of the state. In this era, bargaining powers of workers weakened, and the British economy increasingly was subjected to the "golden straightjacket" (Friedman 1999) of global capital and multinational corporations (Bogdanor 2006).

Post-Thatcher, the question of British politics was management of the globalized "new normal". When Thatcher went from "resolute and determined" to "stubborn and inflexible" (Denver 2011, 87), John Major replaced her. When voters poorly assessed his leadership capabilities in stepped Tony Blair. The Labour Leader to paraphrase Dillow (2007), aimed to govern efficiently with a mandate towards promoting equality and a centrist political agenda. The assumption was that good management could replace the divisive left-right ideological politics that characterized the early Thatcher years and saw Labour in the doldrums. Unfortunately, for technocrats and many Globalists, policies and their implementation often involve trade-offs.

Brexit muted the EU as a voting issue. Jeremy Corbyn proved surprisingly deft at making peace with the need for immigration restrictions, downplayed his dovishness on military matters, and kept Labour's "true" position on Brexit muddled during the 2017 General Election campaign. Underappreciated by pundits was Corbyn's Labour's shift in the direction matching mean positions of the Nationalist profiles on matters of cultural and justice globalism. His personal characteristics aside, Corbyn's positions likely were palatable to anxious Nationalist voters. Parties embracing globalism, the Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party, underperformed in the 2017 General Election.

Corbyn's Labour has established credibility on economic nationalism – unlike "New Labour", nobody could claim Corbyn and his front bench allies have any sympathy for a globalized neo-liberalism. Brexit helps to fulfil the electorate's preferences on cultural and justice nationalism, but does little to present an alternative to economic globalism to the financially hard-pressed British public. Although heavily criticized, the economic vision projected by Jeremy Corbyn seems more in tune with the preferences of the British electorate than Theresa May.

In a weak economy with Brexit looming, it remains to be seen whether even a Labour Government can allay voter anxieties via redistributive policies that build up the skills and hopes of the "left behinds". Even with a renewed government focus on tempering the negatives associated with global neo-liberalism, the question for Nationalists likely will turn to whether or not they benefit from redistributive policies. The perception is that benefits flow disproportionately to immigrants and those on board with the so-called equal rights agenda. In the wake of two divisive General Elections and a Referendum, the consequences of not addressing the problem of status anxiety

and the declining relative position of a large portion of the electorate seem clear. We may be moving into an era where elections hinge on an unsettled Nationalist–Globalist cleavage, one without a crosscutting alternative, and the debate centres around increasingly negative variants of the “thin ideology” of nationalism rather than on the valenced decision of choosing the politician who best can deliver on shared and consensual objectives.

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